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ABSTRACT
A description of the state of the transportation network and services
in the immediate aftermath of the Mexico City earthquake is provided. The
goal has been to identify the major problems faced in the management of
the transportation system pertaining to the overall emergency response and
restoration of normalcy. The type of transportation-related decisions faced
and the consequent actions taken are documented. The documentation is based
on interviews conducted with response agencies officials in Mexico and a
review of the pertinent literature. In addition, official documents have
been obtained from various Mexican government agencies, and are supplemented
by an eyewitness account of the unfolding of the events following the earthquake and the roles played by the transportation system.
Five transportation-related areas have been addressed, namely: 1) the
street and highway network, 2) traffic devices and control, 3) mass transit,
4) emergency vehicles, and 5) crowd management and shelters. The major
problems faced in each area have been identified and the subsequent actions
taken are documented. Based on these findings, the future needs in management of the transportation system in the aftermath of a major urban disaster
have been outlined.
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I.

INTRODUCTION & SCOPE
Mexico City lies in a basin approximately 1,500 square kilometers

surrounded by high volcanoes.
over two million buildings.

It is the home of 17 million people, with
At 7:19 a.m. on September 19, 1985, for al-

most 90 seconds, this largest human settlement in the world was shaken
by a powerful earthquake (8.1 on the Richter Scale). In fact, some researchers (Ref. 1) have concluded, based on collected data, that on the
morning of September 19, Mexico City experienced not one but two equally
powerful earthquakes only 27 seconds apart. Consequently, the September
1985 earthquakes left in their wake an emergency condition rarely
paralleled in human experience.
The extensive destruction caused by the September earthquakes is
well documented.

Table 1 lists an estimate of the damage sustained by

the city as a result of the earthquakes. Not included in Table 1 are the
number of lives lost; estimates vary widely from 4,596 to over 20,000
people.

Table 2 summarizes the resources available and deployed during

the early days following the disaster.
In terms of response and rescue, the efforts and achi evements of
both the government and volunteer workers are highly commendable.

Their

achievements in rescue operations and in. restoring order are better appreciated when one compares the magnitude of the disaster (Table 1) to
the resources available (Table 2). Although the emergency crew of the
various city organizations were in the middle of a shift change when the
fi rst earthquake occurred at 7: 19 in the morni ng, both shi fts engaged
tirelessly in the rescue and emergency operations, often unaware of the

2

Table 1.

Impact of the Earthquake on the City Infrastructure

Infrastructure

Damage Estimate

Reference

Buildings

957 Destroyed
4,771 Damaged

2

Electric Power

38% Reduction in Distribution
capacity
Power Failure in 1/3 of the City

2

Water

27% Cutback in Normal Supply

3

Drainage

2

Solid Waste

Damage Negligible
1.2xl06 m3 of Debris
(Discarded over 2 months)

LP Gas

35% of Storage Plants
Damaged

2

Telephone

Local - 5% of Lines Disrupted
Domestic Long Distance - 70% of
Lines Disrupted
International - All Service
Disrupted

2

CBD Roads

70% Reduction in Capacity

4

Subway

No Serious Damage
Slight Damage to Line No.5
Only Temporary Service Suspensions
for Inspections

5

2

2

3

Table 2. Resources Deployed in the Immediate Aftermath of the Earthquake
Item

Quantity

Reference

Trained Volunteers

35,000

2

Untrained Volunteers

15,000

2

Fire Fighters

800

2

Fire Vehicles

125

2

Fire Stations

7

6

20

6

171

2

15,300

7

1,090

7

Motorcycles

450

7

Tow Trucks

105

7

Police Jeeps

150

7

Police Vans

31

7

Police Helicopters

10

7

Heavy Machinery

850

3

Light Machinery

·1,500

3

Ambulance Stations
Refugee Camps
Police Personnel
Police Auto Patrols

4

fate of their own families.

To add to the danger, the rescue operations

had to be carried out under a highly restrictive transportation network.
Immediately after the earthquake, the traffic control system became inoperational; therefore, the status of the various street links in the
city center was unknown

~o

the emergency crew.

As the morning-rush

traffic, unaware of the magnitude of the disaster, began pouring into
the city center, the transportation logistics problems became more
apparent.

Consequently, the management and restoration of the transpor-

tation system was recognized as an integral and vital part of the
emergency operations.
The objectives of thi s report are to descri be the state of the
transportation services in the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes
and to discuss the roles played by the transportation system in the
unfolding of the events following the earthquakes.

The overall goal is

to identify the major problems faced in the management of the transportation system pertaining to the overall emergency operations and efforts
to restore normalcy and extract lessons from this experience.

The type

of transportation-related decisions faced in the aftermath of the
September earthquakes and the consequent acti ons taken are also documented herein.

The documentation is based on interviews conducted in

Mexico, a review of the pertinent literature, and official documents
obtained from various Mexican government agencies, and is supplemented
by an eyewitness account by one of the authors, Dr. A. Martinez-Marquez.
Five transportation-related areas are discussed, namely: 1) the street
and highway network, 2) traffic devices and control, 3) mass transit, 4)
emergency vehicles, and 5) crowd management and shelters.
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rl.

AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS

Based on interviews held with a number of witnesses, this account
is intended to shed light on some of the many and yet varied experiences
recorded during the

September 19,1985 Mexico City Earthquake.

In

narrative style, some of the critical situations experienced by many are
described herein by an observer involved in Traffic Management at the
time of the earthquake. As a witness, Dr. Martinez-Marquez reflects on
items which warrant further consideration in earthquake mitigation
planning.
II

It was about 0718 hours of that September 19, 1985 day when I

arrived at the parking lot near the office, to attend some usual things
dealing with the Mexico City computerized Traffic Control System I was
in charge of, when I experienced a strange sensation as if the car was
moving and the floor was somehow shaking.

Within my visual scope the

surrounding buildings were subjected to an oscillatory motion barely
perceivable, when I realized that an earthquake was in progress. My
digital wrist watch was displaying 0719 hours.
After experiencing such shaking of the ground, I nearly ran into my
office.

Two young people, responsible for the operation of the Traffic

Control

System,

were

trying

to start the computer on.

They were

depicting some panic in their faces but were more" worried about the
computer not working properly.
get the computer running.

I did try to help, but we just could not

I entered into my office, grabbed my camera,

and went out to see what the situation was outside.
mately 0735 hours.

It was approxi-
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From Plaza de Tlaxcoaque, near the Police Headquarters building, I
started to walk along 20 de Noviembre Ave.

Northbound,-noticing

amazement and surprise on most people's faces, as well as some buildings
which had at least partially fallen down.
also shaking, though emotionally now.

That first experience was

In my path, I was able to take a

picture of a visibly leaning building from the intersection of Fray S.
~

Teresa de Mier and San Antonio Abad Avenue.
belonging to
basement.

Later on, the building,

'Conjunto Pino Suarez,' completely fell

down

to

its

Some people had gotten the impression that the cause was the

vibration generated by a Police helicopter which was flying around.
However,

such a building, my understanding suggests, was under a

collapsing process which could not be stopped by any means.

The

vibration generated by the helicopter acted as a very small perturbation
on a rather unstable structure.
I decided to walk along 20 de Noviembre Avenue and, at the
intersection with Jose M. Izazaga, I turned left and continued taking
photographs of mainly the general aspects of the streets but also of
structural details and the visibly excessive loading which several
damaged buildings were carrying, a loading which appeared to be well
beyond the design load specified by 'Reglamento de las Construcciones
del D. F.

I

(The Mexico City Building-Code Standards). An example of such

loading consisted of fabric rolls oiled up in more than six rows
reaching a height of at 1east 1.50 meters (5 feet) above the steel
platforms sustaining them.

In general the mode of failure of these

buildings resembled that of a house of cards.
There were people leaving the I. la Catolica Metro station display-
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ing horror in their faces, mainly

bec~use

those unbelievable circumstances.

As I was walking along J. Ma. Izazaga

Ave.,

there was nothing to do under

hearing screams of despair, possibly from people trapped, my

feeling of frustration increased mainly because one does not know what
to do.

Such feelings of despair and frustration tend to disappear one

feels relieved when hearing the sounds of ambulances and Police patrols
arriving at the site.

They altogether seem to know WHAT and HOW to do

under those unthinkable conditions.
A number of people were putting wide band stripes of fabric around
the damaged buildings and small houses, as well as apartment buildings,
in the area.

Such fabric had been taken from a collapsed building hous-

ing cloth manufacturing companies which had used some of the floors to
stockpile rolls of fabric regardless of the amount of loading they would
impose on the structure.

Surrounding the damaged buildings by stripes

of fabric was, perhaps, meant to emphasize the excessive loads which had
contributed to the collapse of the building.
I continued along Eje Central until I was able to look at a
collapsed building which had miraculously withstood the July 28, 1957
earthquake.

The building housed a very popular restaurant (La Copa de

Leche) where many people used to have a rather early breakfast. Being an
occasional visitor to that place myself, where my wife and I had first
met, my feelings were mixed between wanting to help the people trapped
inside

or somehow bringing

up

the whole

building.

It was

some

consolation, however, to see on my right the Latin-American Tower still
in place.

Such a tower, a Mexico-U.S. Engineering design, has been a

leitmotif for study and admiration to Civil Engineering in Mexico.
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Coming from the Allende Metro Station, I saw a young man in his
early twenties carrying books under his right arm and some dust covering
his face, with no expression at all.
needed help but got no response.

I was prompted to ask him if he

The whole experience had been so

shocking that no one could ever express it in words.

It would be absurd

to expect any person to be so articulate as to find in his/her vocabulary the needed words.

That young man reminded me of one of my sons

who should have been traveling from home to work by Metro at the time of
the earthquake, and whose whereabouts I did not yet know.
Looking westward, at the intersection of Benito Juarez and Eje
Central (Lazaro Cardenas Ave.) one could not help but notice the collapsed 'Hotel Regis' on Benito Juarez Ave. and the many people who were
merely watching in hel pl essness.
damaged and collapsed buildings.

Northwards, I noti ced several more
I decided to return to the office by

way of Madero Street.
Gl impses of the thi ngs I saw back in 1957, whi 1e in the Mi 1ita ry
Service, began to emerge in my mind as traffic conditions were worsening
on the streets.
functioning.

There was no power, and the traffic signals were not

Drivers were passing other drivers to get ahead by press-

ing their cars' horns.

Few people were

aware that a major earthquake

had occurred since they were used to frequent but light earth tremors.
Meanwhile, continuous honking was in progress and no traffic police were
at hand.

They were possibly preparing to be sent out from their own

respective Sectors (or Coordinating Areas) or perhaps traveling to their
respective posts.

I continued walking along 20 de Noviembre St. back to

my office, encountering people of all walks of life walking in despair.

9

In the meantime, the arrival of police patrols and ambulances had begun.
To state it bluntly, all those units particularly of the police were
doing everything within their power to help people understand the
gravity of the overall problem.
As I was walking back, a pol ice he1 icopter was flying around the
area when a heavy noise was heard from a building at the 'Pino Suarez'
Metro station followed by a rush of people away from the station.

The

building was made of boxed steel columns and trussed beams supporting
reinforced concrete slabs.

Fortunately, when the collapse occurred, the

Metro station was not functioning; otherwise, the victims toll would
have risen. Possibly the vibration induced by the flying helicopter
accelerated the inevitable collapse of the unstable structure already
dangerously leaning southwards.

The steel-framed structure was bent

like a large cantilever beam before its actual collapse.

By about 10:00

o'clock, I started a trip westbound along Fray Servando T. de Mier, this
time by car, to more closely examine the prevailing traffic situation.
It was very difficult to move due to people standing by, just observing
the damaged buildings.

The traffic signals were out of order so that

policemen had to regulate traffic circulation at the intersections.
Near the crossing of 5 de Febrero with Fray Servando T. de Mier, several
buildings had totally collapsed.

In particular a building with flat

slab structure showed only the columns standing, whereas the roofs had
stacked up on top of one another. On the northwest corner of that
intersection, one building had collapsed at the top floors. The nearby
one had collapsed on the front while the back of it was still standing,
showing the inside of each floor.
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Between Lazaro Cardenas and Cuauhtemoc Ave., travel ing was nearly
impossible due to the many collapsed buildings, including a portion of
the 'Televisa' Complex (a television station), and a steel trussed tower
which had fallen over Dr. Rio de la Loza Ave. (continuation of Fray S.
T. de Mier Ave., westwards).

Very few cars were allowed to enter this

section of the roadway. At the intersection with Cuauhtemoc Ave. the
building on the southeast corner, housing several radio broadcasting
stations ('Radio Formula') had also collapsed at the top floors.
Along Chapul tepec Ave. a secondary school bui 1ding had coll apsed,
killing a number of teenagers.

The nearby apartment building, failing

at the top, had completely tilted around, showing the top of the roof as
a 'facade' looking southward. 1I
We tried to enter the Colonia Juarez Area (toward the north from
Chapultepec Ave.) where traffi c encountered a number of

I

cul-de-sacs I

created by a few damaged buildings and the' non-existence of detour
signs.

This situation led into an atypical grid lock, affecting the

surrounding roadways of Reforma Ave. and Insurgentes Ave.

We decided to

leave that area and travel along Insurgentes Ave. Southbound, since a
number of collapsed buildings had been reported along the section between Chapultepec Ave. and Alvaro Obregon Ave. through the Police Radio
channels.

Such a section was immediately cordoned off by the police

force and the transit and other traffic were detoured around this zone
which extended a few blocks ahead to the south.
In returning to the office along Alvaro Obregon Ave., we stopped
the car near Cuauhtemoc Ave. and walked north for a few blocks noting

11

the roofs of the building housing the Secretaria de Industria y Comercio
. (Ministry of Industry and Commerce), had coll apsed. Within our vision
there were a number of other buildings partially destroyed. Near the
intersection of Cuauhtemoc and Chapultepec Aves. many people were
walking in the nearby street which was closed to all traffic.

This was

due to the fact that the Metro line running along Cuauhtemoc St. was out
of service.
Back

in

the office,

the following assessment of the general

situation was made:
a)

the Computerized Traffic Control

Syste~ls

Central Computer

experienced damage at the disk drive units level, though the CPU was
functioning properly;
b)

communication between the supervisory computer and the equip-

ment on the street was completely lost, so that it was not possible to
identify the current status of neither the local controllers nor the
subarea computers;
c)

the rest of the traffic signals, mainly the electromechanical

type, experienced minor damage though several signal posts had collapsed
or were covered with construction debris;
d)

the Traffic Roadway Network was severely damaged in its capa-

city since many isolated links could not be used by vehicles. There were
many other streets which were also closed by the initiative of the
neighborhood residents who later claimed that some buildings were so
damaged that they might fall down at any moment;
e)

by means of the Police Radio System, a number of reports had

been gathered on the damaged or collapsed buildings, and an inventory
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of places where victims rescue operations were needed.

However, we des-

perate1y felt the need for a roadway inventory, including:
i)
ii)
iii)

the number of lanes available after discounting those needed
for activities such as heavy machinery demolition activity
or victims rescue operations;
the streets closed which could be opened to traffic within
24 hours or so; and
finding alternative routes to avoid traffic circulation
around severely damaged areas.
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III.
A.

TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS
STREET AND HIGHWAY NETWORK - PROBLEMS FACED
Upon the occurrence of the September 19, 1985 earthquake approxi-

mately 70% of the normal capacity of the Mexico City central transportation network was lost (Ref. 4).

The loss of the street capacity in

the central region was not due to structural damages to the streets
alone.

In fact, the latter was the least of the contributing elements.

The network capacity was mainly reduced due to blockages caused by
structures collapsing into the streets and compounded by debris from
collapsed structures stored in the streets as search, rescue, demo1 ition, and clean-up progressed. Also contributing to the loss in capacity
were the cordons used to minimize the threat from near-collapse structures and to facilitate rescue operations and heavy machinery assembly.
In addition, at least one source (Ref. 8) identified the gathering of
crowd (volunteers, relatives of victims, and on-lookers) as another
element in the closure and capacity reduction of streets.

Finally, a

number of massive grid10cks in the hours following the 7:19 earthquake
had effectively shut down many street links.
Most of these problems were concentrated in the central region of
Mexico City shown in Figure 1.

This is a zone whose primary streets are

under the control and monitor of the Mexico City computerized traffic
control system since 1982.

Figures 2 also shows the distribution of the

capacity reductions on a street-by-street basis within the affected network shown. The extent of disturbances within the area shown includes:
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i)
ii)
iii)
B.

Access-Controlled Freeways

10.7 kms.

Two-Way Avenues

19. a kms.

Ejes Viales*

68.9 kms.

TRAFFIC DEVICES AND CONTROL - PROBLEMS FACED
The Mexico City computerized traffic control center has been in

operation since November 1982.

In this center, the status of each

signal is displayed on a board map.

When the signal indication for the

main street is green, a green light is displayed on the board.

When the

main street has a red indication, the green light on the board is off.
The red light on the board is only lit when a signal has failed.

The

amber lights on the board show the location of inductive loop detectors
in the city network.
In the aftermath of the September earthquake, thi senti re system
was rendered inoperational.

Although the CPU of the central computer

was functional, the disk drive units were damaged.

Worse yet, the

communication between the central computer and the street hardware was
also lost, hence any rapid assessment of the operational status of local
or master controllers was practically impossible.
The main cause of the communication loss was the failure of the
ducts housi ng the si gna 1 cables.

These concrete ducts had sheared at

the joints as a result of the earthquake.

It is believed that PVC ducts

may have been more appropriate since they are considerably less susceptible to shear forces.

The failure of the power ducts also caused the

* Ejes Viales are one-way streets with 5 or more lanes with one
possible transit counter-flow lane.
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malfunctioning of street hardware such as signal controllers and loop
detectors.

For example, of approximately 634 loop detectors in the city

network, only ten were operational.
A secondary board at the traffic control center assesses the degree
of congestion on various critical intersection approaches by measuring
the loop occupancy time.
an

intermediate

level

A steady yellow light on the board indicates
of

congestion.

This

board

was

also

not

operational due to the loop malfunctions mentioned earlier.
Meanwhile, many traffic signals were not functional due to widespread power failures.

Not knowing the

extent of the disaster, major

lock-ups began to form at the intersections as the peak-hour traffic
began to enter the city center as usual. The traffic conditions were
further aggravated by vehicles entering the normally through-links which
had become cul-de-sacs due to collapsed structures, debris, etc. Consequently, few hours after the first earthquake, major grid-locks formed
in the city center, seriously interfering with the search and rescue
operati ons.
The formation of such grid-locks identifies three other problems
faced,

namely, 1) the effective dissemination of information to the

public, 2) the lack of quickly implementable diversion and detour plans,
and

3)

the

1ack

of

enforcement.

With

proper

di ssemi nati on

of

information in the initial hours after the earthquake, many vehicular
trips destined for the city center could have either been cancelled or
aborted.

Such an effective information dissemination ability is, of

course, conditioned upon an equally effective and quick means of surveying the conditions

in the area.

It is possible that

the extent of
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damages were initially perceived to be relatively light and consequently
such an information campaign was not deemed necessary.

Nonetheless, in

the days following the earthquake the information provided by radio on
detours was not specific enough to identify closed streets and alternate
routes.

The public was simply advised to avoid certain general areas.

An obstacle in implementing a quick traffic diversion and detour
strategy was the lack of availability of a sufficient number of traffic
signs of the kind needed to carry out an operation of such magnitude.
Consequently, drivers would very often find themselves in streets whose
circulation direction had been reversed or which led into a "cu l-de-sac"
condition.
vehicular

In addition, special traffic signs were needed to warn
and

pedestrian

traffic

of

some

of

the

extra-ordinary

conditions which prevailed, such as the near-collapse structures or
demolition and rescue work in progress . .

Finally, the enforcement of

such a great number of diversions, detours, and cordons was also
problematic.

This was particularly the case in the initial hours after

the fi rst earthquake when many of the needed cordons and detours were
set up by volunteers and neighborhood residents themselves, who lacked
an official enforcement authority.
In the days which followed, the primary goal was to restore traffic
services to normal as quicly as possible. As such, efforts were made to
reduce the number and si ze of cordon areas and to devi se network-wi de
diversion strategies to facilitate and gradually improve on accessibility.

The decision was reached after many interorganizational debates

between the traffic division of the Police and the transportation division (CGT) of the office of Mayor.

In connection with this goal, pri-
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orities were needed to be established for the clean-up and opening of
closed streets.

The lack of a systematic street clean-up strategy was

also a problem confronted in traffic management.
C.

MASS TRANSIT - PROBLEMS FACED
The mass transit system in Mexico City is composed of four major

modes:

buses, trolley buses, trams and the Metro.

Together, these

modes of transportation provide over 56% of the total daily travel by
all modes in Mexico City, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

The Breakdown of Daily Person-Trips by Modes
Within the Mexico City Metropolitan Region.
Daily Person-Trips

Percent

Surface Transit
(bus, trol ley, tram)

10,085,554

33.3

Metro
Walk*
Car
Jitney
Taxi
Other Means
Total

6,916,628
6,480,244
4,530,414
1,951,851
164,327
143,928
30,272,933

22.9
21.4
15.0
6.4
0.5
0.5

Mode

This would amount to approximately 17 million person-trips a day.

In

addition, two para-transit modes, namely jitneys and taxis, supply 6.4%
and 0.5%, respectively of the total daily trips.
As expected, the streets in the city center are heavily utilized as
transit and para-transit routes.

Figures 3a and 3b show the concentra-

tion of bus and trolley routes within the city center.

In addition, all

metro lines also converge at the city center (Fig. 3c).

Consequently,

* Trips longer than 5 minutes or approximately 400 meters.
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Figure 3•. Bus routeS in the Mexico City study network.
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the earthquake damages to the central city street network caused major
disruptions in the surface transit operations.
The metro 1ines, carryi ng an estimated 297,000 passengers at the
time of the earthquake, were only momentarily shut down for inspection.
However, the surface transit modes had to undergo route and schedul e
changes due to street closures described earlier.

Such changes required

an effective dissemination of the relevant information to the public.
The route changes and detours also had to consider important changes in
travel needs and patterns produced by the earthquake itself.

These

changes included the travel needs to shelters, relief centers, first-aid
stations, and trips made to incident nodes and information centers in
search of missing relatives.
In light of these additional trip purposes, problems arose regarding setting up make-shift stations and acquiring additional buses to
accommodate the increased ridership demand.

Additional buses were also

in demand to transport excess passengers along those segments of metro
lines which were temporarily out of service. However, since some transit
buses were used to transport victims and relief supplies the supply of
buses was smaller than usual.
In short, it was soon acknowledged that the restoration of mass
transit services to an acceptable level was an essential step in expediting the return to normalcy in the aftermath of the earthquake in
Mexico City.

To this end, major transit problems faced included:

o

Route and schedule changes

o

Service to special trip generators

o

Dissemination of transit-related information
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D.

o

Inspection of Metro lines

o

Alternative service to shut-down Metro lines

o

Short supply of buses due to alternate uses

EMERGENCY VEHICLES - PROBLEMS FACED
Two major problems existed in the emergency response operations.

First, there were an insufficient number of emergency units.

Second,

the emergency vehicles had to be dispatched under highly uncertain conditions.

In addition, there were problems experienced due to disrup-

tions in communication systems and lack of coordination among emergency
response agencies.
The emergency response resources and facilities in Mexico City are
extremely limited compared to other cities of comparable size. For example, while there are 76 fire stations and 8,000 firemen in London,
Mexico City has only 7 fire stations and 800 firefighters, who operate
125 fire engines and work in two 12-hour shifts. The 125 fire engines
accompanied by only 20 ambulances.

Figure 4 shows the location of the

fire stations and ambulances in Mexico City.

It must be noted that the

location of the ambulances are not fixed but rather are distributed according to demand variations with the time of day and day of week.

They

are usually stationed near small police modules.
Despite such limited resources, following the 1985 earthquake, the
Mexico City fire brigade was forced to engage in activities as diverse
as removing crushed walls, quenching fires, preventing gas leakages, and
supplying water to medical facilities.

Within the first 24-hour period

after the earthquake, the fi re bri gade responded to 193 cases of fi re
and 236 cases of gas leakage (Ref. 2). In the three days after the
earthquake,

351 cases of fire were reported;

Figure 5 shows the loca-
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Location of fire stations and ambulances in Mexico City.
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Location of fire outbreaks in the three days following the September 19,
1985 Mexico City earthquake (Ref.2).
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tion of the major fire outbreaks.
A second problem was in dispatching emergency vehicles under unknown route conditions.

Emergency units such as ambulances, rescue

teams, and fire vehicles had to make numerous attempts and diversions,
usually by trial and error, in order to access areas where secondary and
local streets were closed.

This was particularly the case within the

"Co1onia Juarez" and "Co1onia Roma" zones. Figure 6 exemp1 ifies the vehicle di spatch prob1 em through showing the spatial di stri bution of the
critical facilities which were potential origins or destinations of
emergency vehicles.
The dispatch of emergency units was further complicated due to disruptions in communication lines.

For example, the logistics division of

the police had lost their telephone connection to their radio dispatch
center (Ref. 9).

Furthermore, the Metropolitan police had lost their

entire system of communication with the exception of hand radios (Ref.
8).

However, through the four channels available on these hand radios,

they were able to communicate with ambulances and fire divisions.

Finally, there was a general lack of coordination among the various
response agencies. For example, the Army, the police, and mayor's office
launched independent condition surveys to assess the accessibil ity of
the streets, only to discover their redundancy in the meetings which
followed.

Furthermore, in the first 72 hours after the earthquake, the

ambulances and fire engines took whatever routes were available by trial
and error, independent of each other. In addition, they were not pro-
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vided, nor sought input, regarding the street conditions from the agencies which had conducted condition surveys. It should be emphasized
that, in time, the problems stemming from the lack of coordination were
identified and actions were taken to rectify them, as discussed in the
chapter which follows.
E.

CROWD MANAGEMENT AND SHELTERS - PROBLEMS FACED
According to General V. Coronado, Head of the Mexican Metropolitan

Police, there were four different crowd types assembled in the vicinity
of incident points, each type posing unique problems and requiring
special responses.

The four types were: victims, victims· relatives,

on-lookers, and volunteers.
i) Victims
Victims who did
needed

to

not need

immediate medical

be transported

evacuation to

to shelters.

their possessions. In

rent-freeze ordinance,
frozen
quently,

However, their

shelters was not always an easy task

such victims were concerned about looters
to guard

attention

at the

low rates

the

addition,

residential

and

remained

due to
rents

a 1950
had been

in effect at the time.

many victims were reluctant to evacuate

heavily damaged

Consetheir

places of residence for fear of losing

their low-rent privilege once their buildings were
vated.

since

reno-
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ii) Victims' Relatives
Relatives of trapped victims would also gather near the
incident points.

The control of the emotionally-charged

relatives was especially difficult,

and usually beyond

the police capability (Ref. 8).
iii) On-Lookers
The crowd of on-lookers would often be absorbed into the
volunteer force or would otherwise be dispersed.

This was

particularly the case after the second day when volunteers
were registered and given identification

tags.

It was

therefore easy to distinguish on-lookers from volunteers
and require their dispersion.
iv) Volunteers
Volunteers played a vital role in search and rescue operations. Approximately 50,000 volunteers a day participated
in the rescue activities.

All government officials inter-

viewed had consensus on the importance of actions taken by
volunteer individuals and groups.

The only major problem

with the volunteers was the unequal
of such forces.

spatial distribution

The main conflict was in controlling the

excess volunteer crowd at certain incident points.
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IV.

TRANSPORTATION ACTIONS TAKEN

A.

STREET AND HIGHWAY NETWORK - ACTIONS TAKEN
Actions taken regardinq the roadway network in the severely damaged

city center included those aimed at rapidly surveying the conditions of
the various street links, setting up cordons, and disseminating information to the public.

Other actions related to traffic control, public

transit, and emergency vehicles will be discussed in separate sections.
i) Survey of Conditions
Under the auspices of the Secretary General of Police and Traffic,
the IIDisaster Work Headquarters ll was set up to gather data regarding the
status of the network street links and to monitor their conditions with
The main objective was to rapidly evaluate the degree of utility

time.

of each link on the network for traffic circulation.

The initial

inventory started on Thursday, September 19 at about 1300 hours and was
completed by Friday, September 20 at noon.

The data were primarily col-

lected through patrol vehicles and ten police helicopters, all in radio
communication with the logistics headquarters (Ref. 9).

Helicopters

were very useful in surveying the accessibility of the area; however, it
was difficult to assess the conditions of secondary streets from above.
The incoming infonnation was then emptied onto a city map by the
traffic team.

Once the map was completed, it was estimated that the

roadway network capacity within the damaged zone was reduced to nearly
30% of the normal capacity.

Unfortunately, the initiative was not taken

to quickly publicize the efforts in progress and to furnish such a map
and data base to other agencies involved in emergency response operations.
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As such, organizations such as the Office of the Mayor or the Pub. lic Works Department engaged in their own independent condition surveys.
The Transportation Division of the Mayor's Office (D.D.F.), for example,
dispatched twenty observers, on foot, to collect data regarding the
network conditions (Ref. 10).

Each observer was assigned a pre-desig-

nated path to walk and survey.

The data was then returned to the office

and emptied onto a map.

The information was updated in a similar fash-

ion on a daily basis. Mr. Pommerencke, the engineer in charge of this
operation, highly recommended this method of information gathering.
ii) Cordoned Areas
Certa in areas were cordoned primari ly to facil itate the di saster
relief activities.

Other reasons for cordoning off areas included

public protection from near-collapse structures, restoration of utility
services, and prevention of looting.

A total of 54 cordons were set

UP

within the disaster zone, the largest being about 10 blocks by 10
blocks.

The Army, Police, and the National

Guard were

the main

organizations in charge of enforcing and establ ishing cordoned areas.
In addition, some areas were initially cordoned by volunteers first to
arrive in certain disaster sites.

Table 4 summarizes the location of

these 54 cordoned areas along with the authority in charge and the
reason behind the action.
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Table 4.

Cordoned-Off Areas in the Immediate Aftermath
of the September 1985 Earthquakes (Ref. 11)

Cordon
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Luis Maya & Juarez
Dr. Mora St.
Balderas & Hidalgo
Hidalgo & Veracruz
Valerio Trujano & Hidalgo
Central Lazaro Cardenas &
Hidalgo
Lazaro Cardenas & Cuba
Pedro Moreno & Riva Palacio
Heroes St., Mina & Vio1eto
Lerdo & Magnolia
Victoria between Lazaro
Cardenas & Lopez
Moctezuma & Guerrero

Authority

Reason

Army
Army
Army
None
Army
None

Co11 apsed
Call apsed
Collapsed
Co 11 apsed
Collapsed
Collapsed

B1 dgs
B1 dgs
Bldgs
B1 dgs
B1dgs
B1dgs

Army
None
None
None
Police and
Nat'l Guard
None

Collapsed
Collapsed
Co11 apsed
Collapsed

B1dgs
B1dgs
B1 dgs
Bldgs

13. Zaragoza & Alvarado Bridge
Police
14. Bucareli Ave., Abrahan
Gonzales & Lucerna
Police
15. Turin, Versa11es, Chapu1teoec
Ave. & Berlin
20 Volunteers
16. Napoles St., Chaou1tepec Ave.,
Dinamarca & Londres
Police
17. Paseo de La Reforma &
Insurgentes, Berlin &
Hamburgo
Po 1ice
Nat'l Guard &
18. Juarez & Lopez
Volunteers
Army
19. Juarez & Reforma
20. Cuauhtemac Ave., Dr. Norma,
Dr. Pauster & Central Ave.
Nat'l Guard
21. Dr. Norma, Dr. Pauster &
Nat'l Guard
Cauchemco
22. San Antonio Abad #231 & 5
de Febrero, Roa Barcenas
& Rafael Delgado
Nat'l Guard
23. Netzahua1coyot1, 20 de
Noviembre & 5 de Febrero
Nat'l Guard
24. Flamenco, 20 de Noviembre &
Nat'l Guard
Pino Suarez
25. Izazago, 20 de Noviembre &
Po 1ice
5 de Febrero
26. Regina, 20 de Noviembre &
Nat'l Guard
Pino Suarez
27. Mesones, Pino Suarez &
Police
Correa Mayor

Collapsed Sldgs
Damaged
Neighborhoods
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Rescue Operations
Rescue Operations
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
Collapsed B1dgs
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Table 4 Continued
28. Isabel La Cato1ica, Venustiano
Carranza & 20 de Noviembre Nat 1 1 Guard
29. Fray Servando, Bolivar & Eje
Nat'l Guard
Centra1
& Police
30. Dr. Liceaga, Lazaro Cardenas
& Dr. Barragan
Police
Police &
31. Augustin Delgado, Xocongo &
Lorenzo Boturini
Volunteers
Police &
32. Fray Servando, San Antonio
Abad & Chima1popoca
Volunteers
33. Xocongo~ Chima1 poooca , Fray
Servando & C1avijero
10 Vo 1unteers
34. San Cosme, Serapio Rendon,
Antonio Caso, Migua1
Schultz, Alfonso Herrera, Neighborhood
Edison & Insurgentes
Residents
35. Paseo de La Reforma, Rio
Tamesis to Rio Marine
None
36. Chapu1tepec, Oaxaca &
Glorieta de Insurgentes
None
37. Puebla, Oaxaca, Monterrey &
Chapu1teoec
None
38. Oaxaca, Tabasco & Colima
None
39. Oaxaca #54
40. Tamau1ipas, Nuevo Leon &
Cadereita
41. Alvaro Obregon & Nuevo Leon

Nat'l Guard
Nat 1 Guard
Construction Crew

42. Monterrey & Oaxaca Up to
Chapultepec
43. Dr. Balmis, Dr. Lucio &
Cuauhtemoc
44. Dr. Pasteur, Dr. Lucio &
Cuauhtemoc
45. Dr. Andrade, Dr. Marquez &
Dr. Arco
46. Calle Sol #66, Lerdo, Galeana
& Camelia
47. Calle Cdo. de Camelia #5 &
Lerdo
48. Chapultepec #385, Medellin
& Monterrey
49. Xola, Castilla, Andalucia &
& Correspondencia
50. San Antonio Abad, Roa Barcenas
& Juana A. Mateos

1

Police
Neighborhood
Residents
Police

Coll apsed B1 dgs
Zonal Damages
Zonal Damages
To Survey Damages
To Survey Damages
To Survey Damages
To protect residents involved in
emergency
operations 35.
Near-Co 11 apse
Bldgs
Near-Co 11 apse
Bldgs
Near-Collapse
Bldgs
Nea r-Co 11 apse
Bldgs
Near-Collapse
Bldgs
Nea r-Co 11 apse
Bldgs
Near-Co 11 apse
Bldgs

Nat'l Guard

Zonal Damages
Near-Collapse
Bldgs
Collapsed General
Hospital Complex
Truck Traffic
Complex Carrying
Debris
Nea r-Co 11 apse
Bldgs
Nea r-Co11 apse
Bldgs
Near-Collpase
Bldgs
Collapsed Bldgs

Nat'l Guard

Collapsed Bldgs

None
Neighborhood
Residents
Neighborhood
Residents
None
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Table 4 Continued
5l. Dr. Barragan, Universidad,
Casas Grandes & Morena
52. Dr. Vertiz #800, Mitla &
Universidad
53. Xola, Universidad, Lazaro
Cardenas & Cumbres de
Acultzingo
54. Mosqueta, Lerdo &Galeana

Police
Fed. Hgwy
Patrol
Police
None

Partial Collapse
of the Radio Sta.
Partial Collapse
of the Communications Bldg
Partial Collapse
of the Communications Bldg
Collapsed Bldgs
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iii) Information Dissemination
The inter-organizational dissemination of information occurred in
the daily coordination meetings.

During the days following the quake,

a coordination meeting was held every morning (7 to 8:30 a.m.) at the
Police and Traffic Headquarters.

Representatives of various organiza-

tions such as the Army, Public Works, and Office of the Mayor were present.

In these meetings informati on regarding the status of the street

network was exchanged.

Mainly, the information gathered by the Police

and the military would be exchanged and analyzed, hence providing an
additional resource-allocation decision tool to participating organizations.

Interestingly, in these meetings the traditional confl icts and

rivalries among various groups were set aside and all groups appeared to
have a

deeply concerned spirit of cooperation

in the face of the

di saster.
The Army also solicited information from the Police Command Post
and the Transportation Divi sion of the City Ha 11 (Coordinacion General
del Transporte. CGT. de Departamento Di strito Federal) on an as-needed
basis.

The City Mayor and the Public Works Department also acquired

information

from

the Office of Police and Traffic as well

as the

Transportation Division (CGT).
The dissemination of information to the public was mainly through
the newspapers and government radio and television; air time in commercial radio and television was not easily available.

Police patrols were

also furnished with the latest information on the status of the network
and would provide those to the public upon request.
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Both the Traffic Office of the Police and the Transportation Division (CGT) published in the newspapers, maps showing the network conditions.

The main objective on the first day was to discourage the public

from traveling to the severely damaged zones.
were made by police and CGT representatives.

Television appearances

On Friday, September 20,

for examo1e, Dr. Martinez-Marquez as the representative of Pol ice and
Traffic, advised the public in a 20-minute television interview, to refra in from traveling to the damaged zones un1 ess absolutely necessary.
On Sunday, September 22, a representative of Police and Traffic was
interviewed by a commercial
status of the roadway system.

television to inform the public of the
Similar appearances were made by the

Mr. Dominguez-Pommerencke representing the CGT.

The public was informed

that by Monday, September 23, travel activities could resume. That same
night, a general report was also presented, describing the prevailing
conditions a10nq the main travel corridors affected by the earthquakes.
Meanwhile, the public was again urged to avoid the heavily damaged zones
so that the rescue operations could continue.
behalf of the Secretary General

They were also urged on

of Police and Traffic to use their

private vehicles only when absolutely necessary.

"There are still many

people fighting for survival under the rubb1es," the Secretary General
exclaimed, "They surely deserve a chance."

B.

TRAFFIC DEVICES AND CONTROL-ACTIONS TAKEN
Major traffic problems encountered in the inmediate aftermath of

the earthquake included:
1.

Formation of wide-spread grid-locks due to:
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o
o
o

Lack of rapid information dissemination
Absence of quick diversion strategies
Initial lack of enforcement

2.

Loss of power to traffic signals

3.

Failure of communication lines of the central signal system

4.

Need for special warning and diversion signs

5.

Absence of a systematic clean-up strategy

Due to the enormous magnitude of these problems and limited resources,
most actions taken to alleviate them have been rather limited in scope.
Regarding the dissemination of roadway infonnation to the public, actions were taken not immediately after but in the days which followed
the earthquake.

The consequence was the formation of extensive grid-

locks in the central area in the initial hours following the earthquake
which hampered the rescue operations.

Many of the grid-locks were

removed by "flushing out" the vehicles trapoed in cul-de-sacs using
police escorts.

The operations were,

however,

time consuming and

resource intensive, and thus further justified the need for a rapid
information dissemination campaign aimed at preventing such problems.
The information dissemination in the days which followed was mostly
through preparing drawings of the re-designed traffic network which were
published in the newspapers and shown on the commercial and government
television channels.

These drawings were based on inventories of the

damaged areas performed by the Police, the Public Works, and the Office
of the Mayor (CGT).

The pol ice used thei r he 1i copters and the ground

patrol reports to make a first-hand assessment of the conditions.

The

Public Works Secretariat also made a quick and reliable assessment of
the street conditions through the Army's support

in the form of
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motorcyclists sent out on reconnaissance missions.

Such

inventory

activities emphasized damaged buildings and their effects on the street
links. The transportation division (CGT) of the Office of Mayor also
performed their own survey of the conditions in the days following the
earthquake by dispatching on-foot personnel to the field.

The main

objective of the newspaper and tel evi sion informati on bull etins issued
by CGT was to discourage any travel to or through the damaged areas.
The initial inventories assembled at the Police and Traffic Secretariat showed that the overall roadway capacity in the central zone
was reduced to 30%; but there was a possibility of immediate re-opening
of several streets so as to increase the available capacity to 50%. Such
capacity retrieval forced a number of unexpected obstacles including the
simultaneous activities which lacked coordination and the interest of
some government agencies to keeo certain streets cordoned off.

The net-

work re-design, however, was carried out by the Police and Traffic Secretariat with the objective of keeping the cordons to a minimum and
providing diversions around the blocked areas.
A specific outcome of such a re-design process was the identification, on a section-by-section basis, of a capacity deficit for mobility
from north to south near the "Zocalo" area.
necessary
streets.

to

reverse

the

Consequently, it became

traffic circulation

on

some north-south

Even some avenues with medians had to be converted to one-way

streets to make up for the capacity deficit in the southerly direction.
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Regarding enforcement, the police force was not at all adequate to
control traffic and enforce the set up cordons and diversions.

As such,

the Army and volunteers greatly assisted the Police, particularly in the
enforcement of cordoned areas.

Most of the Police efforts were directed

at managing the traffic at intersections with failed signals.

In the

hours after the disaster, traffic control at intersections was restored
to an acceptable level of service through a wide-spread presence of the
police force.

A balanced assignment of priorities by the Police at

intersections with failed signalization helped prevent further gridlocks and expedite rescue activities.
The massive police involvement in traffic control was maintained
for the first two days until signal operations at critical intersections
were restored and diversion strategies were devised and implemented. By
Friday, September 20th, a first draft of traffic diversion plans were
prepared by the Traffic Division and submitted to the Police Operations
Division for its implementation.

The agreed upon diversion plans in-

cluded the following features:
a)

Minimize the number of lane closures along vital street
links.

b)

Identify roadway links which could be opened by simply
removing small amount of debris and artificial obstacles
placed by neighborhood residents to close those links.

c)

Identify those sections of avenues that could be used
for two-way circulation on an alternating one-way basis.

d)

Identify those streets on which the traffic direction
could be reversed with minimal perturbations and effort
in order to further facilitate the rescue and demolition
operations.

e)

Identify sections which could be used in the reversible
mode to favor a dominating direction at different periods of the day.
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f)

Prepare drawings of the re-designed traffic network for
dissemination to the public through newspapers and
television stations.

g)

Assess the need for traffic signing along main travel
corridors affected by diversion plans.

The implementation of these plans on Saturday, September 21 required design and manufacturing of a number of special signs (Fig. 7).
These signs included:
a)

Wooden barricades with mounted ref1ectorized meta1ic
sheets and supported by 1.S-inch steel angle sections.

b)

A two-way sign for originally one-way streets, framed
in a red circle on a navy blue background. The sign
showed two arrows, a white arrow for the originia1 direction of the street and an opposing red arrow to warn
drivers of the existence of on-coming traffic.

c)

A sign to prohibit drivers from entering a roadway section where demolition activities were in progress.

d)

A sign to warn pedestrians of demolition activities.

The massive demolition and clean-up activities also brought about the
need to establish locations outside the most affected region where the
structural debris could be deposited.

Paths were designated and signed

to be taken by trucks transporting the debris to the deposit sites. The
main objective was to speed up the clean-up process so that the debris
was not piled up in the streets, thus hampering the vehicular mobility.
C.

MASS TRANSIT-ACTIONS TAKEN
Modifying a transit route was not merely a problem of finding de-

tours around the disaster zones but also a problem of properly informing
the users.

Given that in Mexico City, transit services are supPlied by

the City Government (RUTA 100), the Transportation Coordination division
(CGT) of the Mayors Office was able to take direct actions to:
a)

Back up the Metro by allocating more buses to transport
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passengers along those segments of any Metro line which
was temporarily out of service.
b)

Allocate buses to provide limited assistance to victims
in carrying their more appreciated belongings.

c)

Modify the surface routes according to a daily assessment of further roadway openings after debris removal.

d)

Use the newspapers to keep the public informed of any
major changes in routes, bus stations, and service frequencies.

In spite of the reduced mobility of people in the first three days,
the earthquake brought about major travel pattern changes.

Shelters,

medical centers, relief and supply centers, and information centers had
become major special "Trip Generators."

Due to the size of the Mexico

City region and the volume of transit passengers handled, it was not
possible to greatly modify the transit routes or implement special
routes as a response to these travel pattern changes.

Consequently,

most such transit riders had to find their way around the transit network to their destinations by trial and error.

D.

EMDRGENCY VEHICLES - ACTIONS TAKEN
In the aftermath of the earthquake, it was necessary to mobil i ze

scarce medical resources to widely scattered location in the city. Sporadic fires had also broken out in many locations (Fig. 5).

Emergency

response agencies, generally understaffed and underequipped, had to make
the most efficient use or their resources.
An essential element in efficient use of resources was the time
savings which could be realized through selection of the best dispatch
routes.

The street network conditions, however, changed very rapidly.

There was no establ ished mechani sm to keep track of these changes.
Therefore, the incident points were simply reached by taking routes that
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were usually taken and modifying them as the need arose.

The various

information bulletins on the street conditions assembled by the reports
from the ground Police patrols and the ten Police helicopters provided
some insight into the major street links to be avoided.

But such in-

formation was not continually updated nor systematically available.
The newly formed organization, SIPROR (Sistema de Proteccion Civil
y Rescate) could take up the vital function of roadway condition
information inventory and its dissemination to all emergency response
agencies. SIPROR was conceived in 1984 as a division of the Police and
Traffic Secretariat.

Its function was to coordinate emergency response

operations in the face of major disasters.

But at the time of the 1985

earthquake, SIPROR was organizationally not yet preoared to assume such
a role.

In addition, as a new group it was not well recognized by other

government agencies.

Thus, at the time of the earthquake, the role of

SIPROR was simply to keep an inventory of supplies such as the amount of
water available for the fire department, the number of vehicles in use,
the location of ambulances, etc.
Since the earthquake, however, a major emphasis has been placed on
developing SIPROR as the focal point in coordinating the emergency response to disasters.

Its functions could include a computerized inven-

tory of resources and supplies available, the most updated survey of
street conditions, the location of incidents and the type of emergency
services needed at each location, receiving and disseminating information from and to the various organizations engaged in emergency response, set-up of shelters and re1 ief posts, and management of rel ief
suppl ;es and other resources sent from other countries, to mention a
few.
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E.

CROWD MANAGEMENT AND SHELTERS - ACTIONS TAKEN
Initia lly after the earthquake, the protection of neighborhoods

from looting was primarily handled by residents themselves. They usually
lived in nearby tents and guarded their residences.

On the second day,

the Police and Army became actively involved in guarding the damaged
areas and preventing looting and riots.
istration scheme was devised.

At this time a volunteer reg-

Badges were distributed to registered

volunteers primarily in order to take effective action in dispersing the
on-lookers.
Immediately after the disaster, 171 shelters were set up by the
City and staffed by volunteers.

The refugees were transported to these

shelters by buses as well as in volunteered vehicles.

Free gasoline was

provided to the volunteer vehicles, which also had to be registered. The
Ministry of Commerce and Industry distributed basic foodstuffs such as
corn, milk, bread, flour, beans, rice, and cooking oil to the shelters.
Water, however, was in short supply.

Even four weeks after the earth-

quake, water tanks were still providing only 1 liter of water per person
per day as compared to the average pre-earthquake water consumption of
50 liters per capita per day.

Long queues were formed for water.

The

water shortages created a charged atmosphere whi ch at times 1ed to
riots.

Containing the tense conditions. would have been much more dif-

ficult had it not been for a wide distribution of water tankers and
water plastic bags throughout the city.

The water supplies were contin-

uously refurbished by the water supplies arriving from the U.S.
Information dissemination about the victims and their whereabouts
was handled mainly by radio and television stations.

Both the commer-

cial and government-owned television channels were used extensively in
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exchanging messages between victims and their relatives and friends. The
television Channel 11, belonging to the National Polytechnic Institute
of

Mexico,

provided

a continuous

broadcast

faci 1itating message

exchanging.
Other mass media were also actively involved.

"Radio Universidad,"

a radio station belonging to the National Autonomous University, broadcast information on the roadway traffic conditions, particularly along
most heavily traveled corridors.

The newspapers published a list of

victims rescued and the place they could be reached.
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v.

FUTURE NEEDS
In 'regard to the survey of street conditions in Mexico City, the

need existed for a central data base accessible to all agencies involved
in emergency response.

Many times, similar surveys were conducted and

duplicated by two or more organizations under conditions which demanded
the best utilization of time and other resources.

In addition, the

accumulated data needed to be incorporated onto a city mao which was
quickly reproduced and modified as conditions changed. Critical decisions also needed to be made on cordoning areas, diverting traffic,
clean-up of streets, and management of transit resources.
Such capabilities would,
main-frame computer facility.

of course, be more feasible with a
Since main-frame facilities were not

available for 72 hours following the September 19 earthquake, a batteryoperated micro-computer is therefore recommended.
facility would

have graphical

The micro- computer

network editing capabilities and be

stationed at a central corrmand post.

All information regarding the

conditions of the street networks would be communicated to the command
center.

The computerized map of the network could then be modified

based on incoming data.

The latest graohical documentation of the

network conditions can then be made available to all interested parties
in the fonn of a hard-copy map or by telecommunication links.

Figure 8

shows a schematic diagram of the proposed command center.
A micro-computer graphical network editing software has been developed for Mexico City and is currently being tested and modified. In

ad-

dition to network editing capabilities, such a software could also have
features which could make it useful as a traffic management tool in de-
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Figure 8.

A schematic diagram of the proposed transportation emergency management
headquarters.
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cisions such as establ ishing cordon areas and simulating alternative
traffic diversion strategies around these areas as well as assessing the
need for quantities and types of special traffic control devices.
software can also be used in dispatching emergency vehicles.

The

A shortest

path algorithm could be developed to identify the shortest path from any
origin to any destination in a network based on the latest network
conditions.

Furthermore, a transit module could be developed to be used

as a decision tool in managing the transit resources, particularly transit vehicles, in light of the diversity of demands for such resources. A
prioritization scheme for street clean-up could also be developed by developing priority indices for each closed street link which are a function of reasons behind the link closure, the relative importance of the
link in accessing critical response facilities, and the degree of utility of the link in serving traffic and surface transit routes.

The com-

mand center may also furnish information on the street conditions to the
public through a hot-line telephone number.
In short, such a command center could effectively fulfill a number
of needs identified regarding the transportation network. Namely, it
would
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

promote more efficient use of resoures
provide wide access to information on
network conditions to all interested
parties
promote further inter-organizational
cooperation; and
provide a real-time microcomputer-based
transportation decision tool.
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